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INTRODUCTION
As securities fraud has grown increasingly transnational,1 it has become
necessary to expand the reach of anti-fraud provisions to persons and entities
participating in global securities markets.2 So far, however, no single
antifraud provision exists to govern the entire global marketplace.3 Although
each country strives to combat international securities fraud by using its own
regulatory regime, problems can develop when extraterritorial application of
*
Visiting Scholar, Columbia University Law School (2013-2014); S.J.D. 2013, LL.M.
2009, Indiana University Maurer School of Law-Bloomington; M.A. in Commercial Law
2005; B.A. in Law 2003, Hanyang University, Seoul, South Korea. The author discloses that
this article is a part of the S.J.D. dissertation submitted to the Indiana University Maurer
School of Law in 2013. The author would like to express his appreciation to Professor Donna
M. Nagy and Professor J. William Hicks for their valuable advice and comments for this
paper. He would also like to thank Professor Hyeong-Kyu Lee for his encouragement. Lastly,
the author would like to thank his family for their devoted support.
1. See Felice B. Friedman et al., Taking Stock of Information Sharing in Securities
Enforcement Matters, 10 J. FIN. CRIME 37, 37 (2002) (pointing out the globalization of fraud).
2. See Kun Young Chang, Multinational Enforcement of U.S. Securities Laws: The Need
for the Clear and Restrained Scope of Extraterritorial Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, 9
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 89, 90 (2003) (discussing regulatory issues arising from the
globalization of securities fraud).
3. See id.
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national securities laws leads to regulatory overlapping or conflicts.4 In light
of these problems, it is necessary to set forth clear guidelines for determining
whether national securities laws can apply extraterritorially and, if so, how
far they can extend.5 The U.S., in particular, has longstanding and extensive
experience in seeking extraterritorial application of national securities laws.6
In doing so, the U.S. has developed several tests to justify extraterritoriality,7
and has bolstered a statutory basis for extraterritorial application of anti-fraud
prohibitions in actions brought by the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) or the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ).8
I. EXTRATERRITORIALITY TESTS PRIOR TO THE DODD-FRANK ACT
A. Extraterritoriality Tests Before Morrison: Effects and Conduct Tests
Until abrogated by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v.
National Australia Bank Ltd. on June 24, 2010, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals had led the way in extraterritorial application of anti-fraud
prohibitions by using two methods: the effects test and the conduct test.9
Under the effects test, subject matter jurisdiction lay in a U.S. court when
“the wrongful conduct had a substantial effect in the United States or upon
United States citizens.”10 In Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, the Second Circuit
introduced the effects test11 by holding that
the district court has subject matter jurisdiction over
violations of the Securities Exchange Act although the
transactions which are alleged to violate the Act take place
outside the United States, at least when the transactions
4. Id. at 90–92; see also INT’L BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 6 (2009), available at http://www.ibanet.org/Document/
Default.aspx?DocumentUid=ECF39839-A217-4B3D-8106-DAB716B34F1E [hereinafter
REPORT ON EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION].
5. See Chang, supra note 2, at 94.
6. See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), abrogated by
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010); Leasco Data Processing Equip.
Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972), abrogated by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869;
Dodd-Frank Wall Street & Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. §§ 929P(b),
929Y (2010) (enacted) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].
7. See SEC v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 192–93 (2d Cir. 2003), abrogated by Morrison, 130
S. Ct. 2869.
8. Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b).
9. See Chang, supra note 2, at 95; see also Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 206; Leasco, 468
F.2d at 1334.
10. Berger, 322 F.3d at 192–93; Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2879.
11. J. WILLIAM HICKS, INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF U.S. SECURITIES LAW § 11:29
(2012).

2014 EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICTS

71

involve stock registered and listed on a national securities
exchange, and are detrimental to the interests of American
investors.12
In later cases, this court stipulated that the “effects” for the purpose of
the effects test must be strong enough to generate “foreseeable and
substantial harm to interests in the United States,”13 and also declared that
mere adverse effects were insufficient to meet the requirements of the effects
test.14
Under the conduct test, by contrast, subject matter jurisdiction lay in a
U.S. court so long as “the wrongful conduct occurred in the United States.”15
Beginning with Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell,16 the
conduct test was used to close the loopholes of the effects test.17 Whereas
the effects test focused on harm to U.S. investors or markets, the conduct test
allowed a federal court to address where the fraudulent conduct occurred.18
Accordingly, a U.S. court could obtain jurisdiction over foreign-related
transactions that involved domestic misconduct even though the frauds did
not harm U.S. investors or markets.19 To prevent the U.S. from being “used
as a base for manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export, even
when these [were] peddled only to foreigners,”20 the Second Circuit
employed the conduct test, requiring that subject matter jurisdiction in the
U.S. would depend on whether “substantial acts in furtherance of the fraud”21
occurred on U.S. soil.22 The court then held that this conduct test would be
satisfied when “(1) the defendant’s activities in the United States were more
than ‘merely preparatory’ to a securities fraud conducted elsewhere, and (2)
these activities or culpable failures to act within the United States ‘directly
caused’ the claimed losses.”23 These two requirements had to be satisfied
12. Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 208.
13. Tamari v. Bache & Co. S.A.L., 730 F.2d 1103, 1108 (7th Cir. 1984).
14. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 989 (2d Cir. 1975); see also Stephen
Choi & Linda Silberman, Transnational Litigation and Global Securities Class-Action
Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 465, 475–76 (2009).
15. Berger, 322 F.3d at 192–93; Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2879.
16. Leasco, 468 F.2d 1326.
17. HICKS, supra note 11, § 11:30.
18. Christine Jarmer, Comment, International Internet Securities Fraud and SEC
Enforcement Efforts: An Update, 73 TUL. L. REV. 2121, 2132 (1999); see also Chang, supra
note 2, at 95–96.
19. Chang, supra note 2, at 96.
20. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975).
21. Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 722 F.2d 1041, 1045 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing IIT,
519 F.2d at 1018); Berger, 322 F.3d at 193.
22. Psimenos, 722 F.2d at 1045; Berger, 322 F.3d at 193.
23. Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Alfadda v. Fenn,
935 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir. 1991)), abrogated by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869.
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even when the SEC, as a plaintiff, filed an action under the conduct test.24
Although these two tests were independently developed, the court
thought that they could be combined with each other.25 Indeed, the Second
Circuit had used both tests “in a combined form.”26 The benefits of this form
were demonstrated in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.27
Following these tests set by the Second Circuit, other circuit courts
adopted similar extraterritoriality tests.28 The specific form of the tests,
however, differed depending on the court in question.29 In particular, the
D.C. Circuit used the strictest form of the conduct test, requiring that “the
American-based conduct at issue had to itself constitute a securities law
violation.”30 The Fifth and Seventh Circuits used a less strict form of the
conduct test,31 requiring that the conduct on U.S. soil “directly [cause] the
plaintiff’s alleged loss in that the conduct forms a substantial part of the
alleged fraud and is material to its success.”32 The Third, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits, by contrast, used the most lenient form of the conduct test,33
“requir[ing] only some activity designed to further a fraudulent scheme to
occur in this country.”34 Under this last form, therefore, mere preparation
may be sufficient to meet the requirements of the conduct test.35 Given the
inconsistency among the courts in defining the required degree of domestic
conduct, the conduct test could not function as a bright line in individual
cases.36 Foreign market participants could not understand exactly what

24. See HICKS, supra note 11, § 11:41 (examining previous cases to see whether the two
requirements of the conduct test should be met even when the SEC, as a plaintiff, brings a
lawsuit). In Berger, however, the Second Circuit acknowledged that, “in cases where the SEC
[brought] suit prophylactically, it [would] be necessary to modify the conduct test to account
for the fact that no harm or loss [had] occurred.” Berger, 322 F.3d at 193, n.2.
25. HICKS, supra note 11, § 11:42.
26. Id.
27. 519 F.2d 974.
28. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2880.
29. See THOMAS HAZEN, TREATIES ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION, § 17.4[1]
(2010), available at 1995 WL 1759427; see also Stephen Choi & Andrew Guzman, The
Dangerous Extraterritoriality of American Securities Law, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 207, 217
(2009); HICKS, supra note 11, § 11:39.
30.HICKS, supra note 11, § 11:39 (citing Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 31
(D.C. Cir. 1987)).
31. Id.
32. Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 667 (7th Cir. 1998), abrogated by
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869; HICKS, supra note 11, § 11:39.
33. HICKS, supra note 11, § 11:39.
34. Id.; SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1977), abrogated by Morrison, 130 S.
Ct. 2869; Choi & Guzman, supra note 29, at 217; HAZEN, supra note 29, § 17.4[1]. These
courts addressed “whether the domestic conduct caused the plaintiff’s loss.” HICKS, supra
note 11, § 11:39.
35. Choi & Guzman, supra note 29, at 217.
36. See id. at 217–18; see also Chang, supra note 2, at 109.
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circumstances put them under the jurisdiction of U.S. securities regulation.37
Similar to the conduct test, the effects test also suffered from certain
problems.38 In particular, it was vague as to what degree of “effects” must be
made on the U.S. in order to meet the requirements of the effects test.39
Thus, the specific extent of extraterritoriality under this test was left unsettled
and unpredictable.40
Also, as internet networks had seen drastic
improvement, overseas activities could unexpectedly impact U.S. markets or
investors.41 Given these circumstances, the effects test risked expanding the
scope of U.S. securities laws too far.42 Such unsettled and excessive
expansion of national laws could infringe upon the sovereignty of other
countries, and thus harm international relations.43
B. Extraterritoriality Tests Under Morrison: Transactional Test
Recognizing the concerns about the effects and conduct tests,44 in 2010
the Supreme Court overruled the two tests set forth in Morrison v. National
Australia Bank Ltd.45 The decision observed correctly that no explicit
statutory basis existed for extraterritorial application.46 Yet, the Supreme
Court went on to address the defects of the effects and conduct tests,47 and
introduced a new test, the transactional test, as the primary standard to be
used to determine the reach of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.48
Specifically, focusing on the text of Section 10(b), the Court held that this
provision applied to cases where fraudulent actions in question accompanied
37. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 29, at 217–18.
38. John Kelly, Note, Let There Be Fraud (Abroad): A Proposal for a New U.S.
Jurisprudence with Regard to the Extraterritorial Application of the Anti-Fraud Provisions of
the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts, 28 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 477, 493 (1997).
39. Id.; Chang, supra note 2, at 110.
40. See Louise Corso, Note, Section 10(b) and Transnational Securities Fraud: A
Legislative Proposal to Establish a Standard for Extraterritorial Subject Matter Jurisdiction,
23 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 573, 576 (1989); see also Chang, supra note 2, at 109–10.
41. George Nnona, International Insider Trading: Reassessing the Propriety and
Feasibility of the U.S. Regulatory Approach, 27 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 185, 198 (2001);
Chang, supra note 2, at 109–10 & n.99.
42. See Chang, supra note 2, at 109–10.
43. See id. at 117–18; see also REPORT ON EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION, supra note 4,
at 5 (stating that a sovereign state can enact legislation to regulate activities arising on its own
soil).
44. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2879–81.
45. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869; see also Letter from Hannah L. Buxbaum, Comments on
Study on Extraterritorial Private Rights of Action Release No. 34-63174, File No. 4-617, 1
(Feb. 18, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-617/4617-14.pdf [hereinafter
Comments by Buxbaum].
46. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883.
47. Id. at 2879–81.
48. Id. at 2884.
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“the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities
exchange or any security not so registered.”49 Through this decision, the
Court sought to remove ambiguity and provide clarity in determining the
reach of Section 10(b).50
In Morrison, Australian shareholders who had purchased stock on an
Australian exchange filed a class action lawsuit against an Australian bank
for violating sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5.51
The plaintiffs contended that the defendant made material misstatements
regarding a mortgage servicing company it intended to acquire.52 In
response, the district court dismissed this case for absence of subject matter
jurisdiction, a decision the appellate court affirmed.53 Finally, the Supreme
Court agreed with the lower courts’ dismissals,54 but rejected their
underlying reasoning, specifically disputing their basis for deciding whether
to grant extraterritorial applicability to U.S. securities laws.55
Various foreign factors played a part in the Morrison case. Most
importantly, the parties involved were Australian—both the individual
plaintiffs56 and the National Australia Bank Limited as defendant.57 The
plaintiffs, in fact, had bought “ordinary shares”58 in this bank, and this stock
was listed on foreign stock exchanges including the Australian Stock
Exchange Limited.59 The case also displayed any number of domestic
dimensions, including the conduct of a subsidiary in Florida and the listing of
American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) on a U.S. exchange.60 In its
reasoning, however, the Court held that the foreign dimensions of the case
were those that were fundamental to it.61
In deciding this case, the Supreme Court introduced significant changes
in interpreting whether U.S. securities laws can apply extraterritorially.62
First, the Court clarified the question of whether section 10(b) could apply
extraterritorially, overturning the lower courts’ treatment of this question as

49. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2011); Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884.
50. See Richard Painter, et al., When Courts and Congress Don’t Say What They Mean:
Initial Reactions to Morrison v. National Australia Bank and to the Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (2011).
51. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2873.
52. Id. at 2876.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2888.
55. Id. at 2876–83, 2888.
56. Id. at 2876.
57. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2875.
58. Id. at 2876.
59. Id. at 2875.
60. Id. at 2875, 2883–84.
61. Id. at 2884.
62. Id. at 2869.
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an issue of subject matter jurisdiction.63 Upon deliberation, the Court
declared that the extraterritoriality of section 10(b) was to be considered a
matter of merits or prescriptive jurisdiction (i.e., whether the conduct fell
within the scope of the statute), rather than one of subject matter
jurisdiction.64 The Court’s decision left no doubt that U.S. federal courts
have subject matter jurisdiction over Exchange Act claims regardless of an
extraterritorial dimension.65 While examining the extraterritoriality of
section 10(b), therefore, the federal courts had to determine whether that
provision extended to the fraud that allegedly occurred (a matter of
prescriptive jurisdiction) and not just whether the courts had authority to hear
the case (a matter of subject matter jurisdiction).66
Given this clarification, the Supreme Court’s substantive analysis of
section 10(b) revealed that this provision did not extend beyond U.S.
territory67 because of the text of the statute:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange . . . [t]o use or employ, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the [SEC] may prescribe . . . .68
The Court then noted that it could not find any explicit provision allowing
section 10(b) to apply extraterritorially.69 The Court thus concluded that
section 10(b) did not extend extraterritorially.70
In its reasoning, the Court indicated that the effects test and conduct test,
as well as a combination of these two, were problematic because they did not
rest on any firm ground, making it impossible to anticipate when U.S.
antifraud provisions applied to a transaction.71 The Court then introduced the
transactional test, which allows section 10(b) to apply to the case where the
63. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876–77.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2877; see also Comments by Buxbaum, supra note 45, at 3–4; Painter, supra
note 50, at 3.
66. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877; see also Comments by Buxbaum, supra note 45, at 3–4;
Painter, supra note 50, at 3.
67. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883.
68. 15 U.S.C. 78j (2011); Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2881–82.
69. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2879–81.
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fraudulent actions in question involve “transactions in securities listed on
domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities.”72
Through this test, the Court sought to provide clarity in deciding whether
section 10(b) applies to overseas transactions.73
Due to the language written in Morrison, however, the transactional test
could be perceived as vague and confusing.74 The most significant problems
with the transactional test arise from this specific wording: “transactions in
securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other
securities.”75 Some people have interpreted this wording to mean that the
location of a transaction is of no concern so long as the security is listed on a
U.S. stock exchange.76 The Court, however, may not have intended such an
interpretation, as the overall analysis in Morrison seemingly did not result in
protecting foreign transactions;77 rather, the Court attempted to strictly limit
extraterritorial application of section 10(b) unless an explicit statute
providing extraterritoriality existed.78 Given this understanding, the literal
interpretation of the transactional test may deviate from the plain intention of
Justice Scalia and the majority.79 The appropriate interpretation, therefore, is
that in Morrison the Supreme Court limited the applicability of section 10(b)
to specific securities transactions that occur within the U.S.80
Morrison’s transactional test would have imposed serious limitations on
the SEC and the DOJ, in addition to private plaintiffs such as those suing in
Morrison itself.81 For example, if a person steals insider information from an
employer within the U.S. and then uses that information to trade securities
outside the U.S., this person would not violate section 10(b) under the
transactional test.82 In SEC v. Liang, a chemist obtained confidential
72. Id. at 2884. In a post-Morrison case, the Second Circuit held that Morrison’s second
prong, a “domestic transaction in other securities,” would be satisfied when “irrevocable
liability was incurred or title was transferred within the United States.” Absolute Activist
Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 68 (2d Cir. 2012).
73. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2886; see also Painter, supra note 50, at 6.
74. See Painter, supra note 50, at 6–7.
75. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884; see also Painter, supra note 50, at 8.
76. See Comments by Buxbaum, supra note 45, at 1 (pointing out concerns about the
potential arguments that might be made based on the language of Morrison).
77. Id. at 1–2 (quoting Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2882); see also Painter, supra note 50, at 9–
10; Comments by Forty-Two Law Professors, Comments on Study on Extraterritorial Private
Rights of Action Release No. 34-63174, File No. 4-617, at 13 (Feb. 18, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-617/4617-28.pdf [hereinafter Comments by Forty-Two Law
Professors].
78. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883; Comments by Buxbaum, supra note 45, at 1.
79. Painter, supra note 50, at 9–10.
80. Comments by Buxbaum, supra note 45, at 1; Comments by Forty-Two Law
Professors, supra note 77, at 13.
81. In his concurrence, Justice Stevens pointed out the defects of the transactional test.
See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2895 (Stevens, J., concurring).
82. Under the transactional test, “[s]ection 10(b) reaches the use of a manipulative or
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information from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and, based
on that information, then traded stocks by using the accounts of Chinese
residents.83 Fortunately for the U.S. government prosecutors, despite using
foreign residents’ accounts, the chemist in this case performed his trading on
the NASDAQ and NYSE Amex.84 If, however, this chemist were to have
traded the stocks on a Chinese exchange, the transactional test would allow
him to avoid liability for violating section 10(b). A person or hedge fund
manager who violates U.S. securities laws but is shrewd enough to execute
his trading outside the U.S. is able to escape liability. Such loopholes in the
transactional test interfere with the government’s ability to prosecute actions
that undermine market integrity and reduce investor confidence in the
fairness of securities markets. In order to partially close these loopholes,
Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Act and restored the effects and conduct
tests in actions brought by the SEC and the DOJ.85
II. EXTRATERRITORIALITY TESTS UNDER THE DODD-FRANK ACT
A. Extraterritoriality Provision of the Dodd-Frank Act
In response to Morrison, Congress added a new provision in the DoddFrank Act that had been pending in Congress for many months.86 In actions
brought by the SEC and the DOJ, this provision establishes a statutory basis
for extraterritorial application of the Exchange Act’s and Securities Act’s
anti-fraud provisions.87 In particular, Section 929P of the Act allows the
SEC and the DOJ to rely on the effects and conduct tests, stipulating that:
(b) EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.—The district
courts of the United States and the United States courts of
any Territory shall have jurisdiction of an action or
proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission or the
United States alleging a violation of the antifraud provisions
of this title involving—
deceptive device or contrivance only in connection with the purchase or sale of a security
listed on an American stock exchange, and the purchase or sale of any other security in the
United States.” Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888.
83. SEC v. Liang, Compl. 1–2, 8:11 CV 00819-RWT (Jun. 2, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp21987.pdf [hereinafter Liang Complaint];
see also Liang, Litigation Release No. 22171 (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
litreleases/2011/lr22171.htm.
84. See Liang Complaint, supra note 83, at 5–9.
85. See Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b); see also HICKS, supra note 11, § 11:50.
86. See Richard Painter, The Dodd-Frank Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Provision: Was It
Effective, Needed or Sufficient?, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 196, 199 (2011).
87. See Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b).
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(1) conduct within the United States that constitutes
significant steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the
securities transaction occurs outside the United States and
involves only foreign investors; or
(2) conduct occurring outside the United States that has a
foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.88
Congress enacted this extraterritoriality provision for the purpose of
guaranteeing the robust police power of the SEC and the DOJ against
offshore securities frauds.89 Regardless of Morrison, therefore, the SEC and
the DOJ are once again able to rely on the effects and conduct tests in
establishing extraterritorial securities fraud in violation of Rule 10b-5.90 In
other words, they can file a lawsuit against perpetrators of multinational
securities fraud on the ground of violating anti-fraud provisions so long as
the effects or conduct test is met under Section 929P of the Dodd-Frank
Act.91
B. The Effects, Conduct, and Transactional Tests After the Dodd-Frank
Enactment
From the Morrison decision and Dodd-Frank enactment, it is clear that
the SEC is equipped with several statutory grounds for extraterritorial
application of U.S. anti-fraud provisions.92 One basis is the anti-fraud
provisions themselves; in Morrison, the Supreme Court declared that the
transactional test could be inferred directly from one of the anti-fraud
provisions.93
Based on these provisions, then, the SEC can bring
extraterritorial enforcement actions against a securities fraud that occurs in
connection with U.S. securities transactions, even though the fraudulent
scheme concerns overseas activities.94
A second basis is Section 30 of the Exchange Act.95 This provision is
designed to combat instances where a broker-dealer commits securities fraud
on offshore markets in order to avoid U.S. securities regulation.96 Under this
provision, the SEC can apply the Exchange Act to those who pursue their
fraudulent scheme by committing “actions abroad that might conceal a
domestic violation, or might cause what would otherwise be a domestic
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
See HICKS, supra note 11, § 11:50.
See id.
See Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b).
See Painter, supra note 86, at 214–15.
See id.
See id.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd (2006 & Supp. 2011); see also Painter, supra note 86, at 215.
Painter, supra note 86, at 215.
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violation to escape on a technicality.”97 In order to use Section 30, however,
the SEC would have to promulgate rules pursuant to this provision.98 With
these in place, the SEC would be able to apply the Exchange Act’s antifraud
provisions to certain overseas transactions, such as where a U.S. citizen uses
a Canadian brokerage firm to buy stock listed only on a Canadian exchange
and there are only nominal contacts between the brokerage firm and the
U.S.99
Figure 1.
Extraterritoriality in SEC Enforcement Actions Under Morrison

A third and final basis for extraterritorial application is Section 929P of
the Dodd-Frank Act.100 Even if the facts of a foreign-related fraud do not
meet the transactional test inferred from the antifraud provision, the SEC can
bring enforcement actions against the perpetrator by using the effects or
conduct test restored by the Dodd-Frank Act.101 In other words, the DoddFrank Act allows the SEC’s enforcement powers to reach securities fraud
that involves “conduct within the United States that constitutes significant
steps in furtherance of the violation”102 or “conduct occurring outside the

97. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2882–83; see also Painter, supra note 86, at 215.
98. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2885; see also Genevieve Beyea, Morrison v. National
Australia Bank and the Future of Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Securities Laws, 72
OHIO ST. L.J. 537, 572 (2011).
99. Beyea, supra note 98, at 572 (citing Kook v. Crang, 182 F. Supp. 388, 389 (S.D.N.Y.
1960); see also Martin E. Goldman & Joseph L. Magrino, Jr., Some Foreign Aspects of
Securities Regulation: Towards a Reevaluation of Section 30(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 55 VA. L. REV. 1015, 1027 (1969).
100. Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b).
101. See id.; see also HICKS, supra note 11, § 11:50.
102. Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b).
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United States that has a foreseeable substantial effect within the United
States.”103
Figure 2.
Extraterritoriality in SEC Enforcement Actions Under
Morrison and the Dodd-Frank Act

Though the Dodd-Frank Act allows the SEC to keep using the effects
and conduct tests, it is doubtful that the extraterritoriality provision of this
Act can remove the ambiguity that existed before Morrison.104 This is
primarily because Section 929P mirrors words used by appellate courts
before Morrison.105 In particular, the meaning of the phrases “significant
steps in furtherance of the violation”106 and “a foreseeable substantial
effect”107 in Section 929P is unclear, and still left in the hands of courts.108
Such ambiguity in the extraterritoriality provision can cause controversy in
prospective cases, as it did before Morrison.109 It can also mislead the SEC
to initiate enforcement actions in a case that displays only feeble U.S.
interest,110 destroying international relations accordingly.111 The effects and
conduct tests restored by the Dodd-Frank Act result in claims that overlap
with those of other countries’ transactional tests, which remain more
fundamental. In Figure 2, the region designated “Overseas Transactions”
demonstrates this risk.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Painter, supra note 86, at 212.
Id.
Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b).
Id.
See Painter, supra note 86, at 212.
Id.
See id. at 216.
See Chang, supra note 2, at 117–18.
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III. HARMONIZING THE OVERLAPPING APPLICATIONS OF
NATIONAL SECURITIES LAW
When interpreting the effects and conduct tests under the Dodd-Frank
Act, the SEC, the DOJ, and the federal courts may consult pre-Morrison
decisions made by the courts of appeals.112 Before Morrison, the precise
definitions of the effects and conduct tests were left unsettled.113 As a result,
it was unclear exactly what circumstances put foreign market participants
under the jurisdiction of U.S. securities regulation.114 Addressing this
concern about the effects and conduct tests, in Morrison the Supreme Court
overruled the Second Circuit’s use of these two tests.115 Congress, however,
enacted a provision in the Dodd-Frank Act that allows the SEC and the DOJ
to keep using these two tests for purposes of their own prosecutions.116 For
this reason, even after Morrison and the Dodd-Frank enactment, the courts
may examine how the Second Circuit interpreted the effects and conduct
tests with respect to actions initiated by the SEC and the DOJ.117
Even if courts apply the aforementioned interpretations to a postMorrison case, it still remains difficult to determine exactly when the effects
and conduct tests should be applied.118 This is primarily because determining
whether conduct occurs in the U.S. or when misconduct affects the U.S.
depends on specific facts in a particular case.119 Such ambiguity in the
extraterritoriality provision of the Dodd-Frank Act can sway the SEC and the
DOJ to initiate enforcement actions in cases that prompt only negligible U.S.
interest.120
The SEC and the DOJ also face instances where the effects and conduct
tests restored by the Dodd-Frank Act result in claims that overlap with the
claims of other countries’ transactional tests, which remain more

112. See Painter, supra note 86, at 209–10, 212.
113. It was unclear what degree of “effects” must be executed in the U.S. in order to satisfy
the requirements of the effects test. See Kelly, supra note 38, at 493; see also Chang, supra
note 2, at 110. Each circuit also defined the form of the conduct test in different ways. See
HAZEN, supra note 29, § 17.4[1]; Choi & Guzman, supra note 29, at 217; HICKS, supra note
11, § 11:39.
114. Choi & Guzman, supra note 29, at 218; Kelly, supra note 38, at 493; Chang, supra
note 2, at 110.
115. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2869; see also Comments by Buxbaum, supra note 45, at 1.
116. See HICKS, supra note 11, § 11:50.
117. Painter, supra note 86, at 209–10, 212 (stating that in order to interprete Section 929P
of the Dodd-Frank Act, the courts may refer to some form of the effects and conduct tests
created by the courts of appeals before Morrison).
118. Id. at 212.
119. See id.; see also Choi & Guzman, supra note 29, at 215–16.
120. See Painter, supra note 86, at 216.
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fundamental.121 For example, in SEC v. McClellan,122 misappropriation of
non-public information occurred within the U.S., but transactions of
securities based on that information occurred outside the U.S.123 Arnold
McClellan obtained non-public information while working at Deloitte Tax
LLP and disclosed that information to his wife, Annabel McClellan, in the
U.S.124 His wife then tipped off her affiliates, James Sanders and Miranda
Sanders, who resided in the U.K.125 Since James Sanders traded derivatives
based on the non-public information outside the U.S.,126 he has been more
appropriately prosecuted in the U.K.127
Indeed, the SEC filed an
enforcement action against only Arnold McClellan and Annabel
McClellan,128 while the U.K. FSA brought legal actions against others,
including James Sanders and Miranda Sanders.129 This sort of partitioning of
enforcement helps prevent friction in the process, for if the SEC sought to
prosecute not only U.S. insiders but also U.K. traders, jurisdictional conflicts
might arise between the SEC and the FSA.130
For this reason, the SEC and the DOJ should be careful in exercising
their extraterritorial jurisdiction. That the SEC and the DOJ can legally
assert extraterritorial jurisdiction does not mean that they should always
assert it, particularly when other countries have equal or greater claims to
enforcement. If the SEC and the DOJ aggressively, abusively, or unilaterally
insist upon extraterritorial application of U.S. antifraud provisions under the
Dodd-Frank Act, international relations can be significantly impaired.131 As
a result, foreign authorities may become reluctant to provide cross-border
cooperation, leading to frustration in investigating even multijurisdictional

121. See Genevieve Beyea, Transnational Securities Fraud and the Extraterritorial
Application of U.S. Securities Laws: Challenges and Opportunities, 1 GLOBAL BUS. L. REV.
139, 159 (2011).
122. SEC v. McClellan, Compl. 1, CV-105412 (JCS) (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2010), available
at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21758.pdf [hereinafter McClellan
Complaint].
123. SEC v. McClellan, Litigation Release No. 21758 (Nov. 30, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21758.htm [hereinafter McClennan Litigation
Release]; see also McClellan Complaint, supra note 122, at 8.
124. McClellan Complaint, supra note 122, at 1.
125. Id. at 1–2, 4.
126. Id. at 8.
127. See Painter, supra note 86, at 220.
128. McClellan Litigation Release, supra note 123; see also Press Release, FSA, SEC and
DOJ Investigation Leads to Two People Being Charged by the SEC with Insider Dealing in
the U.S., FSA (Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/library/communication/pr/2010/
169.shtml.
129. Press Release, Five Charged with Insider Dealing, FSA (Nov. 25, 2010),
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/PR/2010/166.shtml.
130. See Painter, supra note 86, at 220.
131. Chang, supra note 2, at 117–18.
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cases that are predominantly related to the U.S.132 Indeed, being too
aggressive and unilateral in enforcing U.S. securities laws outside the U.S.
may cause foreign countries to be hostile to the U.S.133
When, therefore, securities transactions occur abroad, the SEC and the
DOJ should multilaterally consult with foreign authorities related to the case
before seeking to apply U.S. antifraud provisions extraterritorially.134 Such a
cooperative approach is necessary for countries to solve jurisdictional
problems that arise when fighting international securities fraud.135 By
unilaterally being more conservative about their extraterritorial enforcement,
the SEC and the DOJ can reduce criticisms from other countries, but they
cannot ultimately eliminate jurisdictional conflicts.136 This is mainly because
other countries seeking extraterritorial enforcement can easily destroy
jurisdictional stability that is unilaterally achieved.137 Furthermore, excessive
unilateral restrictions can create regulatory loopholes for transnational
securities fraud.138 For this reason, the SEC and the DOJ should bilaterally
or multilaterally resolve the jurisdictional conflicts that arise in international
securities enforcement.139
In order to make this practice more common, the International
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) should require each
member regulator to consult with each other when faced with an
extraterritoriality issue. Furthermore, the IOSCO should promulgate a
guideline showing how to cooperatively deal with jurisdictional overlapping.
As shown in the International Bar Association’s report on extraterritorial
jurisdiction, such a guideline should outline how to designate a lead regulator
from among those of different countries, and then charge the lead regulator
with conducting an investigation.140
Through this cooperative approach, each country’s regulators can resolve
the jurisdictional overlapping before it becomes controversial, and so the
extraterritorial application of each country’s securities laws can be well
harmonized.141 The regulators can also obtain assistance from other
countries in an early stage of investigation, and thereby “avoid duplication of
132. See id.
133. See Painter, supra note 86, at 220; see also Beyea, supra note 121, at 165.
134. See REPORT ON EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION, supra note 4, at 26 (addressing a
cooperative approach).
135. See id. In global financial markets, securities regulators need to secure assistance from
foreign authorities. HICKS, supra note 11, § 11:53.
136. Beyea, supra note 121, at 159; see also Joshua G. Urquhart, Comment, Transnational
Securities Fraud Regulation: Problems and Solutions, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 471, 478 (2000).
137. Beyea, supra note 121, at 159; see also Urquhart, supra note 136, at 478.
138. Beyea, supra note 121, at 154.
139. See REPORT ON EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION, supra note 4, at 26.
140. Id. at 300.
141. Id. at 26.
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information requests and interviews.”142
Finally, the regulators can
effectively combat transnational securities fraud without allowing any
regulatory loophole.143

142. Id. at 300.
143. See Beyea, supra note 121, at 154.

